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E-Mail: hblaw@hbsb.com 3 4 5 RICHARD W. HORTON (NV Bar No. 1542) **LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS** 6 Suite 1100 Bank of America Plaza 50 West Liberty Street 7 Reno, NV 89501 Telephone: (775) 788-8666 8 Facsimile: (775) 788-8682 E-Mail: rhorton@lionelsawyer.com 9 Attorneys for Thomas A. Dillon, Independent Fiduciary of Employers Mutual Plans 10 11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA 13 14 Thomas A. Dillon, Independent Fiduciary CASE NO. CV-N-03-0119-HDM-VPC 15 of Employers Mutual Plans, 16 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF's OPPOSITION TO **OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY** ٧. 17 James Graf, et al. Date: July 23, 2003 18 Time: 9:00 a.m. Defendants. Dept.: One 19 Magistrate: Judge Valerie P. Cook 20 Plaintiff, Thomas A. Dillon, as the court appointed Independent Fiduciary of the 21 thousands of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, submits this opposition to the objections to 22 discovery filed by defendants: 23 Gary Bastie 24 Anthony DiRienzo Edward Farley 25 James Lang William Starling 26 Filed concurrently herewith is the Declaration of Robert L. Brace 27 28 PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY

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#### **SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS**

Defendants Gary Bastie, Anthony DiRienzo, Edward Farley, James Lang and William Starling (hereinafter referred to as the "Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers") have filed several objections with the Court which (i) substantively attack Plaintiff's Complaint and (ii) procedurally object to Judge McKibben's Order compelling Defendants to respond to interrogatories before allowing defendants to file Motions to Dismiss. The Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers' substantive arguments, which should be made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12 and 56, can be recharacterized as follows:

- (1) ERISA applies to the Defendant Insurance Producers' conduct and ERISA pre-empts state law. Therefore, Dillon does not have state law based causes of action for breach of contract, negligence or breach of warranty of authority against the defendant Insurance Producers.
- (2) Judge Hagan's Order of February 1, 2002 in <u>Chao v, Graf, et al.</u>, Case No. CV-N-01-0698 DWH-RAM holds the present Civil Proceeding in "abeyance".
- (3) The case must be dismissed because there is no evidence of unpaid claims or injured parties.
- (4) Dillon is precluded from suing the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers because two state court cases have been filed and dismissed as against these defendants.

II.

#### SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS

Procedurally, Judge McKibbens is in control of this case. The Court has complete authority to control the Order of discovery and the timing of motions.<sup>1</sup> Judge McKibben

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Although not without limits, the court's express and inherent powers enable the judge to exercise extensive supervision and control of litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rules 16, 26, 37, 42, and 83, contain numerous grants of authority that supplement the court's inherent power to manage litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(12) specifically addresses complex litigation, authorizing the judge to adopt "special procedures for managing potentially difficult protracted actions that my involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems."

ordered the defendants to respond to the interrogatories within 45 days after service of the Complaint which the defendants have failed to do. The defendants are entitled to file motions to dismiss at a date to be set at the Initial Pre-Trial Conference which is on August 26, 2003. The defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that Motions to Dismiss must be heard before discovery is due.

The first objection raised by defendants contends that ERISA pre-empts state law in this case. Substantively, the defendants are in error. An Employee Benefit Welfare Plan ("EWPB") is created when an employer agrees to purchase health insurance for his or her employees as a benefit of employment. Once the EWPB is created, ERISA governs the relationship between the ERISA entities. The ERISA entities are the employer (Plan Sponsor), the fiduciaries of EWPB and the beneficiaries of the trust or Participants of the Plan. ERISA does not govern the relationship between the EWPBs and third parties who contracted to provide services to the EWPBs. State law governs this relationship and state insurance laws controlled the transactions whereby the Defendant Insurance Producers solicited and sold defective health insurance to the EWPBs.

Defendants second objection argues that Judge Hagan's Order of February 1, 2002 in Chao v. Graf, et al. bars the commencement of this action due to the imposition of a stay. Defendants are misguided. That very Order gave Dillon standing and expressly authorized him to file the subject action against the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers.

Defendants third objection asserts that this action is to be dismissed for lack of evidence. For purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the allegations in Dillon's Complaint that the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers sold the defective insurance and there are unpaid claims attributable to their sales must be assumed by the Court to be true. The Declaration of Robert L. Brace providers further proof that the allegations are true. Defendants have not filed any evidence to rebut this evidence and the objections to discovery are not the proper procedure to raise this issue or resolve it.

Defendants' final objection asserts that the suit is precluded by earlier Judgements of

dismissal. As shown in the Declaration of Robert L. Brace, the defendants were properly dismissed from the State Court litigation filed in Florida because the cause of action pursued by the Plaintiff belonged to Dillon, and not the Plaintiff who filed the action. In addition, the Plaintiff who filed the action did not purchase her insurance from the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers so there was no privity of contract or duty owed to that Plaintiff by these Defendants. Dillon is not precluded from suing the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers in this Civil Proceeding because these same defendants were dismissed in other proceedings.

III.

# DILLON'S STATUS AS INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY MAKES HIM THE PROPER PARTY TO BRING THE CIVIL PROCEEDING AND JUDGE HAGAN EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DILLON TO FILE IT

On December 12, 2001, Elaine Chao, the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, filed a complaint in the United District Court for the District of Nevada against, among others, James Graf for ERISA violations in the matter entitled <u>Chao v. Graf, et al.</u>, Case No. CV-N-01-0698-DWH-RAM (hereinafter referred to as the "ERISA Proceeding").

On December 13, 2001, in the ERISA Proceeding, the United States District Court appointed Thomas A. Dillon as the Independent Fiduciary of the Employers Mutual Plans with the authority "to pursue all legitimate claims . . . the Employers Mutual Plans may have against third parties which, in his judgment, are likely to result in a meaningful recovery of assets to pay participant claims or the costs of administration."

The Employers Mutual Plans are the thousands of individual EWBP's created by the individual employers when they agreed to provide medical, surgical and hospital care benefits to their respective employees and beneficiaries (hereinafter referred to as "Participants") by purchasing the health insurance sold by the Defendant Insurance Producers.

On February 1, 2002, in the ERISA Proceeding, the United States District Court ordered that Plaintiff Thomas A. Dillon "shall continue to serve as the Court's Independent Fiduciary of the Employers Mutual Plans with plenary authority to administer said entities" and that

Thomas A. Dillon "shall collect, marshal, and administer the assets of . . . the Employers Mutual Plans including those sums owing and payable to them, process the Employers Mutual Plans' unadjudicated claims and pay those which are found to be legitimate, identify all creditors of the entities and the amount of their claims, and take such further actions with respect to said entities which may be appropriate. The Independent Fiduciary shall exercise full authority and control with respect to the management or disposition of the assets of the Employers Mutual Plans . . . [T]he Independent Fiduciary is authorized to pursue all legitimate claims . . . the Employers Mutual Plans may have against defendants or third parties which, in his judgment, are likely to result in a meaningful recovery of assets to pay participant claims or costs of administration. The Independent Fiduciary's authority includes the authority to seek relief in this Court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651 [and] to obtain quasi-bankruptcy protection for the Employers Mutual Plans if appropriate."

On April 30, 2002, in the ERISA Proceeding, the United States District Court, exercising its equitable jurisdiction over the Employers Mutual Plans, their respective participants and beneficiaries, as well as over the creditors of the EWBP's, entered an Order Establishing a Quasi-Bankruptcy for the thousands of Employers Mutual Plans. The Court imposed a quasi-bankruptcy proceeding for the equitable dissolution of the EWBPs and their assets, which is an equitable bankruptcy remedy to ensure that the equitable policies underlying ERISA are satisfied. See <u>Cutler v. The 65 Security Plan</u>, 831 F. Supp. 1008, 1022-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); All Writs Act, 28. U.S.C. §1651; and <u>SEC v. Gould</u>, 622 F.2d 1363 (1980).

In the Order Establishing the Quasi-Bankruptcy, the United States District Court created the following categories of creditors of the Employers Mutual Plans (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Creditors"):

a. The Independent Fiduciary, his attorneys, actuaries, accountants, consultants and other professional service providers retained by the Independent Fiduciary who have incurred or will incur fees or wages on or after December 13, 2001 ("Administrative Creditors");

- b. The Participants and beneficiaries of the EWBPs who have paid out-of-pocket for medical and health claims, other than co-payments and deductibles, that should have been paid by the alleged insurance purchased by the Employers Mutual Plans ("Category A Creditors");
- c. The medical and health providers of the participants of the Employers Mutual Plans ("Category B Creditors");
- d. All other service providers of the Employers Mutual Plans ("Category C Creditors"); and
- e. Any other remaining obligations of the Employers Mutual Plans ("Category D Creditors").

In the Order Establishing the Quasi-Bankruptcy, the United States District Court reconfirmed the powers granted the Independent Fiduciary in the Court's Order filed on February 1, 2002 and reiterated that the Independent Fiduciary had "the power and duty to take any and all actions necessary and proper to fully effectuate" the Court's Order, including, without limitation, "the responsibilities to initiate, defend and settle litigation" on behalf of the EWBPs.

In the Order Establishing the Quasi-Bankruptcy, the United States District Court ordered that assets of the thousands of Employers Mutual Plans recovered by the Independent Fiduciary through litigation against third parties shall be distributed and the priority of payment to Creditors shall be as follows:

- a. Administrative Creditors shall have first priority and shall be paid 100 percent of their claims;
- b. Category A Creditors shall have second priority and, as funds permit after payment of the Administrative Creditors, shall be paid 100 percent of their claims;
- c. Category B and Category C Creditors shall receive pro rata distribution of the funds remaining after payment of the Administrative and Category A Creditor claims; and
  - d. Category D Creditors shall receive pro rata distribution of the funds remaining

after payment of the Administrative and Category A, B, and C Creditor claims.

Pursuant to the Order Establishing the Quasi-Bankruptcy, the United States District Court ordered that after the final pro rata distribution was made, the Court shall then issue a permanent injunction barring any adverse actions against the Employers Mutual Plans and their Participants by any and all Creditors for claims associated with defective health coverage purchased by the Employers Mutual Plans for their respective Participants, and otherwise discharging those claims.

On March 3, 2003, this lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada by the Independent Fiduciary against approximately 400 defendants alleging, among other things, that when the Defendant Insurance Producers sold the defective health insurance to the thousands of EWPBs they: (i) breached their contracts to procure insurance, (ii) committed malpractice and (iii) breached their warranty of authority as agents. This action entitled Thomas A. Dillon, as Independent Fiduciary v. James Graf, et al., Case No. CV-N-03-0119 HDM-VPC is referred to as the "Civil Proceeding."

IV.

### DILLON'S CIVIL PROCEEDING AGAINST THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE PRODUCERS IS BASED UPON STATE LAW, NOT ERISA

A. <u>ERISA Does Not Pre-empt State Law Negligence Actions Against Professionals</u>
Who Provide Services to an EWBP.

Insurance Producers are generally considered to be agents of the insureds. <u>Boulton v. Phoenix Worldwide Industries, Inc.</u>, 698 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In this Civil Proceeding the insureds are the EWPBs who purchased health insurance for their respective Participants. Congress did not intend ERISA preemption to extend to state law tort claims brought against Insurance Producers who sold insurance to EWBPs. <u>Morstein v. National Insurance Services, Inc.</u>, 93 F.3d 715 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996).

When a state law claim brought against a non-ERISA entity does not affect relations between principal ERISA entities, then the claim is not pre-empted by ERISA. As a corollary,

actions that affect the relations between EWPB entities, on the one hand, and outside parties, on the other hand, similarly escape preemption. <u>Airparts Company, Inc. v. Custom Benefit Services of Austin</u>, Inc., 28 F. 3d 1062, 1065 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994). The Insurance Producer is not an ERISA entity. ERISA entities are the employer, the plan fiduciaries, and beneficiaries under the plan. <u>Morstein</u>, at 722-723.

In the case at bar, the ERISA entities (the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries) are all united with Dillon in his efforts to secure redress from the incompetent Insurance Producers. As stated by the 10<sup>th</sup> Circuit:

"A recovery from defendants will increase the coffers of the plan; a defeat will mean that the plan has expended money in fruitless litigation. Such a tangential effect, however, is not enough to relate these state law claims to the plan itself." Airparts, at 28 F. 3d 1066.

The third circuit in Painters of Phila. Dist. Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F. 2d 1146, 1153 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1989) observed:

"We feel that professional malpractice actions brought by a plan are directly analogous to the situation in <u>Mackey [Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.</u>, 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988)], and that, in the absence of an explicit corresponding provision in ERISA allowing a professional malpractice cause of action, Congress did not intend to preempt a whole panoply of state law in this area." Id., at 1153.

Other Federal Court cases holding that malpractice actions against Insurance Producers who sold insurance to EWBPs are not preempted by ERISA include: <u>Giannetti v. Mahoney</u>, 218 F.Supp.2d 8, (2002), and; <u>Wilson v. Zoellner</u>, 114 F.3d 713 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

- B. <u>Dillon's State Law Based Causes of Action Are For Breach of Contract, Negligence</u>
  and Breach of Warranty of Authority.
  - (i) Breach of Contract to Procure Valid Insurance

On the Breach of Contract claim, Dillon has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish:

- (1) The existence of a contract;
- (2) The EWBPs' performance on the contract;

- (3) The Insurance Producer Defendants' failure to perform; and
- (4) Damages caused by the breach.

A contract to procure insurance is created between an Insurance Producer and its clients when the clients agree to purchase the insurance offered by the agent. Eddy v. Sharp, 199 Cal. App. 3d 858 (1988). An Insurance Producer breaches his contract with the insured if he fails to obtain the insurance coverage requested by the insured which the Insurance Producer agreed to procure for the insured. <u>Ibid</u>.

The clients of the defendant Insurance Producers were the individual EWBPs who were seeking to purchase health insurance as a benefit of employment for their respective employees. The EWBPs request to the defendant Insurance Producers for health insurance coverage was an invitation to the defendant Insurance Producers to make an offer by submitting a proposal for coverage. No contract comes into existence between the Insurance Producer and the client until the EWBP accepts the offer of the Insurance Producer to procure the requested coverage. An agreement to accept the policy offered is sufficient consideration. Duncanson v. Service First, Inc., 157 So. 2d 696(Fla. 3d DCA (1963).

The Insurance Producer is liable for breach contract to procure insurance if at the time the contract to procure insurance was entered into the Insurance Producer had no actual or apparent authority to bind the insurer. The Insurance Producer must respond to damages to the extent of the loss which would have been recoverable under the terms of the proposed policy. <u>Id.</u>, at 699.

As alleged in the Civil Proceeding, the EWBPs requested the defendant Insurance Producers to procure coverage for their employees. The Defendant Insurance Producers offered to obtain health insurance issued by Golden Rule (and other A-rated carriers) and the EWBPs accepted the offer. At such time, a binding contract was formed obligating the defendant Insurance Producers to obtain the coverage as outlined in their proposal. Dillon contends that the defendant Insurance Producers breached the contract because they were not authorized to bind Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) and could not obtain the

coverage as promised. Id., at 699.

(ii) Insurance Producer Negligence

On the Claim for Insurance Producer Malpractice, Dillon must prove:

- (1) The defendant Insurance Producers performed services for the EWBPs;
- (2) The defendant Insurance Producers had a duty to perform the services in a reasonably prudent manner with the care and skill ordinarily used in like cases by reputable members of the same industry practicing in the same locality under similar circumstances;
- (3) Damages to the EWBP clients by the defendant Insurance Producers' failure to use such care and skill.

State and Federal courts regularly have found that insurance agents can be held to professional standards of conduct. *See, e.g., Moore v.* Kluthe and Lane Insurance Agency, Inc., 89 S.D. 419, 234 N.W.2d 260 (S.D. 1975)(an agent who holds himself out as being qualified to procure insurance is required to exercise the particular skills reasonably to be expected of one in that occupation); Fiorentino v. Travelers Insurance Company, 448 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Penn. 1978) (the duty owed by an insurance agent to an insured is to obtain the coverage that a reasonable and prudent professional agent would have obtained under the circumstances).

In Florida, the courts described Insurance Producers as advisors, law interpreters, and the provider of the "best package" of insurance for their clients. Pierce v. AALL Insurance, Inc., 513 So.2d 160, 161 (1981). The courts however, refuse to recognize insurance agents as professionals for statute of limitations purposes under its bright-line test. Pierce v. AALL Insurance, Inc., 530 So. 2d 84, 87-88 (Fla. 1988). Insurance Producers remain liable for ordinary negligence when the improper rendering of the Insurance Producers services causes damage to their client, the insured. Bitz v. Ed Knox CLU & Associates, P.A., 721 So.2d 823 (Fla.3rd DCA 1998).

Whether the conduct of the defendant Insurance Producers in the case at bar is

measured by standards of ordinary care or a heightened standard set for professionals, the conduct fell below what was required. As alleged in the complaint, the defendant Insurance Producers failed to confirm that Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) agreed to bind coverage, they failed to confirm that James Graf was authorized by Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) to bind coverage, they failed to investigate Employers Mutual LLC, or defendant Graf's sixteen (16) Nevada Associations, and they failed to obtain health insurance from Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) as they had promised.

(iii) Breach of Warranty of Authority as an Agent of a Principal

A cause of action for breach of warranty may be alleged against an agent who purports to make a contract on behalf of a principal, and represents that he has the power to do so. In McKnight v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 242 So.2d 478 (Fla.3d DCA 1970), the court quoted the provision set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329 that such a representation by an agent becomes a warranty:

"A person who purports to make a contract, conveyance or representation on behalf of another who has a full capacity but whom he has no power to bind, thereby becomes subject to liability to the other party thereto upon an implied warranty of authority, unless he has manifested that he does not make such warranty or the other party knows that the agent is not so authorized." McKnight, at 480.

This action for breach of warranty of implied authority was first adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in <u>Tedder v. Riggin</u>, 65 Fla. 153, 61 So. 244 (1913) where the Court said:

"An agent, purporting to act for and bind a principle whom he has no authority to represent, is liable for breach of implied warranty or in tort to the extent of any damages resulting to the other party from such misrepresentation of authority." citing Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 lowa, 39, 99 N.W. 128.

On the claim for Breach of Warranty of Authority against the defendant Insurance Producers Dillon must prove:

(1) That the defendant Insurance Producers represented to their respective client EWBPs that they were authorized to sell health insurance issued by Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers);

(2) That the client EWPBs relied upon the representations;

- (3) That the defendant Insurance Producers were not authorized by Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) to sell the insurance; and,
- (4) Damages to plaintiffs legally caused by the breach.

In the instant case, the EWBPs were solicited by with the defendant Insurance Producers as they sought to provide their employees with health insurance. The defendant Insurance Producers represented to the EWPBs that Golden Rule (or the other A-rated carriers) would provide the appropriate insurance and that they were authorized to sell the insurance as offered on their behalf. The EWPBs relied upon the representations to their detriment and the representations were false.

٧.

## THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE EWBPs

#### A. <u>Commission Sharing Arrangements.</u>

As noted in the Declaration of Robert L. Brace, Dillon has accumulated computer data from various sources, including the wholesaler of the defective product, Associated Agents of America, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "AAA"). The data from AAA identifies each Insurance Producer who sold the defective insurance to each EWBP as well as the commission sharing arrangement between the retail Insurance Producer and his or her up line Insurance Producers in privity of contract with the EWBP client.

From this data, Dillon can run reports on each insurance producer under AAA which identifies the EWBP client as well as the employees of each EWBP client. The social security numbers of each Participant are then used to link the unpaid claims of the participant first to the employer, then to the retail Insurance Producer and ultimately to each intermediary Insurance Producer involved in any given transaction of insurance involving the defective purchase of health insurance.

#### B. Gross Unpaid Claims v. Adjudicated Unpaid Claims.

Plaintiff Thomas Dillon hired a third party claims administrator ("BMS") to adjust and adjudicate the unpaid claims. There are approximately 10,000 claims that remain to be adjudicated. The gross unpaid claims of those claims adjudicated to date total over \$42,000,000.00. "Gross Unpaid Claims" are the amount billed the participants by the providers without deductions for co-pay, yearly deductibles or preferred provider discounts. BMS adjusted the "Gross Unpaid Claims" but did so by first deducting the preferred provider discounts before making deductions for co-pay and yearly deductibles. Plaintiff intends to readjust the claims and eliminate the deduction for preferred provider discounts because those discounts no longer apply due to the failure to pay the claims in a timely manner.

## C. The Gross Unpaid Claims Caused by the Sales by the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers.

Attached to the Declaration of Robert L. Brace are gross unpaid claims reports for the sales by the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers. The totals are:

<u>Defendant Insurance Producer</u>	Amount of Attributable Unpaid Claims	<u>Exhibit</u>
Gary Bastie	\$200,632.58	#1
Edward Farley	\$53,243.85	#2
James Lang	\$67,907.73	#3
William Starling	\$4,526,029.19	#4
Anthony DiRienzo	\$1,579.00	#5

VI.

# THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR LAWSUIT IN FAVOR OF THE OBJECTING INSURANCE PRODUCERS HAS NO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN THIS CIVIL PROCEEDING

#### A. Muniz v. Employers Mutual, L.L.C., et al.

The Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers submit to this Court a final Judgment of Dismissal in a case entitled <u>Debra L. Muniz, et al. v. Earl Grant Darbyson, et al.</u>, Case No.

В.

CA02-00986AN pending in the Circuit Court for the 15<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (hereinafter the "Muniz Class Action"). The Muniz Action Judgment of Dismissal was entered in favor of the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers, without class certification because: (i) Debra Muniz bought her defective insurance from Earl Grant Darbyson and not from the objecting defendant Insurance Producers so there was no privity of contract or duty owed to the Plaintiff and (ii) the court was put on notice th at Thomas Dillon was appointed Independent Fiduciary with the sole authority to pursue the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers for malpractice. (Declaration of Robert L. Brace, ¶ 6, Exhibit 6). Thomas Dillon stands in the shoes of those EWPB's that purchased the defective insurance from the Objecting Defendant Insurance Producers and therefore he does have privity of contract and standing to sue the defendants for malpractice.

#### B. Kemmerer v. N.A.P.T., et al.

The defendant Insurance Producers also submit to this court a Final Order of Dismissal with Prejudice in a case entitled <u>Jeannie Kemmerer</u>, et al. v. N.A.P.T., et al., Case No, 01-4775A1 pending in the Circuit Court for the 15<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (hereinafter the "Kemmerer Action"). The Kemmerer Action involves a completely different health plan than the one involved in the case at bar and therefore has no relevance or res judicata effect to the Civil Proceeding brought by Dillon.

VII.

#### THE COURT ORDERED THE SUBJECT DISCOVERY

Attached to the Declaration of Robert L. Brace as Exhibit 7 is an Order from Judge McKibbens in the Civil Proceeding which was filed on March 26, 2003. The Order specifically demands that the defendants answer the interrogatories within forty-five (45) days after service of process. The Order reads as follows:

"Within 45 days after service of process on a defendant, said defendant shall provide to plaintiff's counsel a list of all clients who purchased the subject insurance by or through said defendant, as well as a list identifying all insurance producers who participated in each transaction. The limited discovery allowed is that set out in Attachment B to this Order."

The discovery is relevant and necessary. Defendants are in violation of Court Order. Judge McKibbens has complete authority to manage the affairs of his courtroom including the ability to dictate schedules regarding discovery and motions.

#### VII.

#### ALL MOTIONS ARE STAYED IN THE CIVIL PROCEEDING

As noted on page four (4) of Judge McKibbens Order, all motions are stayed. Defendants objections, which should be made by way of motion, are also in violation of Court Order and should be overruled as such.

#### VIII.

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

The Court should overrule defendants' objections. Defendants should be ordered to respond to the outstanding discovery forth with. Defendants will have the opportunity to raise procedural and substantive arguments after the Initial Pre-trial Conference set for August 26, 2003.

HOLLISTER

DATED: **7**, 2003

sy: Khan

### **PROOF OF SERVICE**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA

I am employed in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 1126 Santa Barbara Street, Santa Barbara, California 93101.

93101.		
TO OBJECTIONS by placing	On July 11, 2003, I served the foregoing documents described as PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION STO DISCOVERY; DECLARATION OF ROBERT L. BRACE on the interested parties in this action	
	a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes to the addresses on Page 2 attached hereto.	
I caused	such envelope to be deposited in the mail at Santa Barbara, California. The envelope was rage thereon fully prepaid.	
I am "readily familiar" with Hollister & Brace's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.		
	Executed on July 11, 2003, at Santa Barbara, California.	
X (State)	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.	
(Federal)	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.	
	SHELLEY J. CHORUTON	

### DILLON v. GRAF, et al. SERVICE LIST, Page 1

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